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cities. 
The activity of the members of the Contract Buyers 
League is apparently having an additional educational 
effect. The best evidence for this can be seen in the fol-
lowing remarks made at a Contract Buyers League 
meeting by a young black man who spends considerable 
time working with young people in the area. 
"I spend a lot of time with student groups-"the now 
generation." You hear sometimes some people in high 
school and college talk about what should have been 
done. The fact is that until Dr. King there wasn't much 
we could do. But I am so proud to see you, my parent 
generation, standing up and fighting and being very 
resolved that you will not be turned around. It gives me 
an added dimension in terms of my resolve and my hope 
for the kind of world.and society which we are going to 
have. Some people misunderstand when they hear young 
people talk about black power. Immediately they begin 
to react and say that means violence. It doesn't really. 
The thing is that people get tired of being misused, and 
when you get tired, you do whatever you have to do to 
stop being misused. But with restraint, and cleverness, 
and skill and cunning CBL has managed to maneuver its 
way to the doors of victory without giving way to those 
kind of emotions of hate or shortsightedness or any kind 
of rashness. 
"I know that you have been pushed to the very brink 
of doing things that some young people are doing now. 
But I just get a warm feeling whenever I am here and 
when I think about the kinds of struggles-the mental 
struggles, not only the financial sacrifice that has been 
made, and the kinds of doubt that run through every-
body's mind. But when I see so many people who have 
such a thorough understanding of what they are doing 
and why they are doing it-my parent generation-I 
really feel like we can look forward to an America that 
is really worth living in, a country that is worth living in 
for everybody. And as long as everybody respects every-
body, there is no reason why this country shouldn't be 
fit to live in. 
"I just wanted to thank you for being what you have 
been and for making me feel as good as I do about what 
you have done. And I admire the patterns that you have 
laid down especially because of your restraint and 
agressiveness and the tension between them that you 
have been able to maintain. Some young people could 
look at that and learn a lot from it." 
These results are neither as dramatic nor as romantic 
as revolution. Only Chicago has been affected. But it is a 
start towards the solutions which American society so 
desperately needs. 
The Contract Buyers League: 
A Personal Evaluation 
by Alan Boles 
Alan Boles, a student at Yale Law 
School, worked with Contract Buyer's 
League from the early summer in 1969 
through the summer of 1970. 
The most spectacular, and probably 
the most important event in the three 
and a half year history of the Contract 
Buyers League was the payment strike 
which began in July 1969 and was 
phased out in June 1970. By the end 
of the strike somewhere around 100 
families had been thrown out of their 
homes in an all too familiar spectacle: 
300 sheriffs deputies and police, 
equipped with gas masks, truncheons, 
dogs, helicopters and all the anti-riot 
trimmings, would surround entire city 
blocks and evict as many as 12 families 
at a time. Fortunately, CBL managed 
to reinstate most of these families 
fairly rapidly. 
Wee~ly CBL meetings, formerly 
routine, became teeming, tense 
strategy sessions. Hundreds of CBL 
members got wrapped up in round-the-
clock lookouts for the sheriff and 
massive re-occupation operations for 
evicted families. CBL was suddenly 
flung out of its obscurity onto tele-
vision screens around the country and 
onto the pages of many national publi-
cations. Jesse Jackson, Ralph Nader, 
Mayor Daley, scores of Chicago 
politicians and community groups paid 1
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heed to the CBL problem. Many 
offered advice. A few offered help. 
The payment strike was undertaken 
for essentially five reasons: 
(1) To hasten the resolution of the 
lawsuits by forcing settlements with 
the con tract sellers. 
(2) To ensure that if CBL won the 
lawsuits, the sellers would provide 
rebates to those contract buyers who 
by the time of final judgement had 
paid more than a fair price on their 
contract. 
(3) To provide immediate economic 
relief from heavy monthly contract 
payments for the buyers who wished 
to reduce their payments. 
( 4) To give the buyers a sense of 
power in resolving the dispute them-
selves, or at least in adding their 
economic power to the power of their 
lawyers. 
(5) To provide immediate relief 
from the indignity of having to make 
monthly payments to men whom the 
contract buyers believed had been 
exploiting them on the basis of race. 
The strike really had been en-
visioned as a complement to the 
judicial process. 1 t was an effort to 
improve the quality of justice for black 
people by stepping up the pace at 
which the lawsuits were resolved. 
CBL's experience with the courts was 
used to legitimatize the strike. CBL 
had been giving the courts a good-faith 
try, but the whole process was just too 
slow. The suits were likely to drag on 
for years, and the buyers could not 
accept continuing their burdensome 
contract payments that long. The 
strike was designed to remedy that 
problem. The irony, however, was that 
over time the strike became unsuccess-
ful and perhaps even counter-produc-
tive in its attempt to accelerate the 
pace of the judicial process. And, on 
further examination, the third and 
particularly the fourth rationales above 
turned out to be fairly insubstantial. 
Instead of forcing out-of-court 
settlements, the strike seemed to have 
the effect of pushing most sellers 
farther from the negotiating table. The 
hold-out did pressure a few small 
sellers to settle, and it did trigger some 
mortgage foreclosures which worked 
to the benefit of the contract buyers. 
But in general it apparently was not 
massive enough to provide the econo-
mic clout needed to bring the larger 
seller around. It appears that the sellers 
survived pretty well-apparently on 
the payments from the majority of the 
buyers who did not participate in the 
strike-and generously indulged their 
sense of outrage at what they deemed 
the buyers' irresponsible and illegal 
conduct. Negotiating sessions in Judge 
Will's chambers ceased as soon as the 
pinch of the strike began to be felt, 
and the principal counsel for the 
majority of the big sellers made it a 
practice to scream in and out of court 
that his clients would never negotiate 
with "a gun at their heads". 
As the spectre of evictions loomed 
larger, the strike was viewed less as an 
economic club and more as a political 
tactic. The hope among some CBL 
members was that widespread public 
revulsion at the evictions would lead 
Mayor Daley to intervene and bludg-
eon the sellers into negotiating. While 
widespread public revulsion did ensue, 
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and while Mayor Daley did intervene 
in a part of the dispute, settlement 
basically put the buyer-seller relation-
ship back to what it had been before 
the strike was begun. No re-negotia-
tions of the contracts occured. 
More than just dampening settle-
ment talks, the strike seemed to 
impede pre-trial progress on the main 
federal civil rights actions. It is 
probably safe to say that most of the 
CBL lawyers were skeptical of the 
efficacy of the strike when it was first 
proposed. They argued that the legal 
problems raised by the strike would 
complicate and impede their work on 
the main federal suits and would anger 
Judge Will. The prophesies of the CBL 
lawyers were largely fulfilled. Al-
though a large number of additional 
volunteer lawyers were summoned to 
the CBL cause to work solely on 
eviction cases and strike problems, 
difficulties of coordination and 
strategy among the new and old groups 
of lawyers proved insurmountable. 
The mainstay CBL lawyers, along with 
their non-lawyer staff workers, were 
burdened with the majority of the 
legal problems occasioned by the 
strike-appeals, criminal trespass suits, 
the escrow money and evictions. 
The strike also detracted from the 
willingness of many contract buyers to 
cooperate with the CBL lawyers in the 
work on the main federal lawsuits. 
There are about 3,500 plaintiffs in the 
two federal suits. The plaintiffs were 
turned up after an elaborate search 
process, which involved at various 
times canvassing neighborhoods, 
checking land titles at the title com-
pany, advertising in newspapers, word-
of-mouth publicity, examining records 
of the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation and following 
up lists of contract buyers provided by 
the sellers themselves. Most people got 
into the suit because they happened to 
fall under the court-formulated defini-
tion of the plaintiff class and were un-
covered in the discovery process, 
rather than because they had actively 
sought to include themselves in the 
case. Approximately 700 were 
involved in the strike. Perhaps another 
300 have actively participated in the 
CBL organization in other ways. That 
left about 2,500 plaintiffs who had 
few direct ties with the CBL organiza-
tion; while they naturally hoped for a 
favorable outcome to the controversy 
they may have had misgivings about 
getting involved. 
As the winter of 1970 wore on, 
CBL became identified in the minds of 
many of these people, not as the 
organization which was trying to 
rectify their exploitive housing agree-
ments, but as the outfit which, 
through some mysterious process, got 
them evicted from their homes. Con-
sequently, they wanted to have as little 
to do with CBL as possible for fear 
that contact would lead to eviction. 
Workers on the CBL suits found many 
buyers reluctant to respond to inter-
rogatories propounded by the defend-
ants or to a questionnaire devised by 
the CBL lawyers, and generally 
reluctant to offer their cooperation. A 
few buyers, without informing the 
CBL lawyers or their staff, settled with 
their seller for contract reductions 
smaller than was fair, and then got dis-
missed from the suit. A small number 
of highly disaffected CBL members on 
the South Side, who broke away from 
the organization as a result of tensions 
produced by the strike even attempted 
to interfere actively with the discovery 
process. 
The strike also alienated Judge 
Hubert Will, who had previously taken 
a sympathetic position toward CBL. 
As the strike continued and CBL press 
releases became slightly more strident, 
the judge began to take personal 
affront. He felt in particular that the 
CBL slogan "Justice Delayed ls Justice 
Denied" was hurled to the public as a 
slur on his handling of the case. 
Though Judge Will certainly did not 
react to these imagined insults by 
slowing down the pre-trial proceedings, 
his increasingly hostile attitude and 
outbursts of temper tended to· make 
hearings a personal and professional 
ordeal for the CBL lawyers. 
As I stated at the start, the strike 
was also prompted by CB L's fear that 
if it won the lawsuit the sellers would 
find some way to avoid paying 
damages to buyers who had paid more 
money to the sellers by the time of 
judgement than the sum of the princi-
pal and interest on the fair price 
established by the court. Despite the 
legitimacy of this concern, CBL dis-
covered after the payment strike had 
begun that only a fairly small propor-
tion of the strikers were even very 
close to having paid this amount. 
Judge Will's order of April 3, 1969, 
containing a scheme to withhold half 
of the seller's profits from each 
monthly contract payment, seemed 
adequate to meet the problem of pro-
viding a cushion for damages. How-
ever, near the outset of the strike 
Judge Will announced he would not 
enforce this arrangement, which then 
lapsed until the next spring. 
CBL also argued as justification for 
the strike that the monthly contract 
payments constituted an economic 
hardship from which the buyers 
deserved immediate relief. There is no 
doubt that the highly inflated contract 
payments have been a heavy burden 
for many CBL families. However, 
there is a real question whether the 
families would prefer to reduce 
monthly payments to a more com-
fortable level or to continue to pay the 
full amount each month and thereby 
reduce the outstanding balance much 
more quickly. My own observation 
was that most contract buyers were 
disturbed by the feeling that their 
con tract balance was shrinking too 
slowly to be paid off more than by the 
economic deprivation caused by the 
monthly payment. And in fact, when 
given the choice of making their full 
monthly payment to the CBL escrow 
fund, or paying an amount equal to 25 
percent of their income into the fund, 
the vast majority of buyers elected to 
pay the full amount. 
All this is not to say, however, that 
valid and sufficient reasons for the 
payment strike were lacking. But the 
most compelling reasons cannot be 
framed in terms of economic hardship 
or legal strategies, simply because CBL 
at the core is not about either. CBL 
had evolved into a unique community 
organization whose arsenal of weapons 
contained both litigation and Alinsky-
style action tactics. But this is an un-
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easy combination, since a community 
organization which uses legal tactics to 
fight issues and build itself up may 
find those same tactics eroding its 
foundations. 
1 n my opinion, the prime function 
of CBL was to bring ghetto people to-
gether, to give powerless people an 
issue around which they could organ-
ize, to provide them a sense of dignity 
and control over their environment. 
While the contract issue is of course 
extremely important in itself, it should 
be viewed primarily as a means toward 
CBL's main purpose of building power 
in the ghetto. Such a purpose may 
very well be contrary to the ideal of 
litigation. By shifting from "street 
tactics"-picketing, visits to realtors' 
offices and homes, publicity cam-
paigns, etc.-to litigation, a community 
organization runs the risk of trans-, 
fering initiative and power from the 
hands of the people into the hands of 
lawyers. 
The strike was a way of retrieving 
the sense of direct participation in the 
struggle which had lapsed when the 
federal lawsuits came into the fore-
front of CBL tactics. Until the end of 
the strike CBL members were twined 
together like steel cable in their com-
mon effort to defy the contract sellers, 
to hold back payments, to present 
their arguments to the public and to 
ward off the sheriffs eviction forces. 
Until the beginning of April 1970 
when Sheriff Woods managed to per-
fect his eviction technique, morale 
had soared and CBL had become a 
much more vital organism than ever 
before. Winning the contract dispute is 
not the sole purpose of CBL, though 
it has to win such issues to remain 
credible. Its purpose is to build the 
ghetto's power. The issue central to 
the contract dispute is not really the 
contract sellers' ill-gotten financial 
gains, but rather the questions of 
power and dignity that are wrapped up 
in the seller-buyer relationship. The 
buyers were initially angry at being 
victimized because of their race. But in 
addition to this injury of inflated 
prices and bad terms, most buyers 
were continuing to suffer the humilia-
tion of subsequent dealings with the 
sellers, in which they were saddled 
with costly, substandard insurance, 
gouged on home repair work, and had 
extra, unexplained charges added on 
to their accounts-all by sellers who 
made no attempt to extend any under-
standing or courtesy to them. 
The judicial process itself became 
something of a vehicle to recoup this 
dignity. Any observer at the weekly 
CBL meetings could sense the obvious 
delight of the buyers that the big-shot 
downtown attorneys were in their 
corner for once and that those lawyers 
were willing not just to argue for them 
but to confer with them. Pre-trial 
hearings in federal court were often 
heavily attended by CBL members. 
Interest in the proceedings was intense. 
With the lawyers cloaked as champions 
of the people, a certain vicarious ful-
fillment flowed from the courtroom 
tournament between CBL's legal 
heroes and the sellers' lawyers and-in 
instances where the sellers were 
attorneys-the sellers themselves. 
The payment strike was much the 
better way to regain some of this 
dignity, because it meant the direct 
participation of the buyers in their 
own battle. The strike wore on. The 
obstacles to a timely, favorable ruling 
on the Illinois eviction law became less 
negotiable. The spectre of evictions 
loomed up as reality. And it became 
apparent that the people did not want 
to pay the sellers largely because'of 
the humiliation of dealing directly 
with the sellers. The main issue was 
not so much whether CBL was willing 
to phase out the strike and relinquish 
the hold-out money CBL was willing; 
the real issue was to whom CBL was 
willing to relinquish that money. CBL 
even offered twice to pay all the 
sellers' costs on the contracts and turn 
over the balance of the monthly pay-
ments to the clerk of the federal 
court-a scheme that came very close 
to the economic arrangement outline 
in Judge Will's order of April 3, 1969. 
Significantly, what the CBL proposal 
left out was the provision in the court 
order calling for the buyers to make 
their payments directly to the sellers. 
The strikers could not stomach the 
idea of resuming the old relations with 
the sellers. In their corner, the sellers 
could not swallow the notion of 
having contract payments to them 
filtered through a court-appointed 
agent. 
In the course of his involvement in 
the lawsuit, Judge Will recognized the 
link between the contract payments 
and the deprivation of dignity which 
the buyers felt. "Only the most 
parochial view of the Civil Rights Act 
would identify its ultimate function to 
be simply the restoration of any 
monetary loss suffered on account of 
race," he wrote in an opinion on a 
Statute of Limitations question. "The 
indignity alleged to have been suffered 
in this case cannot be confined to the 
dates of execution of the various con-
tracts, but can be understood only in 
relation to the continuing activity 
whereby the alleged indignity con-
tinues to be inflicted and exploited." 
Though he noticed the problem, his 
notion of a remedy was evidently 
money damages at the outcome of 
litigation, assuming CBL won. But a 
court "victory" of damages which 
comes after years of payments on 
humiliating deals can provide only 
partial satisfaction. Judge Will would 
have done much better to re-fashion 
the law creatively so as to take into 
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